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ABSTRACT
Government trust is generally helpful for societies, especially in crisis situations, such
as during the COVID-19 pandemic, because governments rely on citizens to follow
directives. Worldwide, with supporting evidence accumulating, a key directive has
been to wear face masks. However, in Sweden, the government has questioned their
usefulness. On other behavioral recommendations, such as handwashing, the government has taken a conventional path. We rely on this non-recommendation of face
masks to examine the causal impact of government trust on behavior. Based on a
large Swedish survey fielded during the pandemic, we find that higher government
trust reduces the likelihood of wearing face masks. In contrast, higher trust increases
the likelihood of handwashing. The findings qualify the conclusion about the beneficial consequences of trust.
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A long-held truth in the social sciences is that high levels of citizen trust in government is conducive for democracy, in large
part because it helps in generating legitimacy for authoritative
decision-making (Hetherington, 2005; Marien & Hooghe, 2011;
Rothstein, 1998). The importance of trust is particularly acute
during crises, when citizens are expected to follow instructions
from government authorities (Christensen & Laegreid, 2005;
Siegrist & Zingg, 2014). Thus, in order to manage crises, including
the COVID-19 pandemic, governments rely on citizens to agree to
even far-reaching restrictions on their personal freedoms (Devine
et al., 2020; Van Bavel et al., 2020).
Taking the trust-compliance relationship as the point of departure, our paper makes two contributions to this literature. The
first concerns are to address the need for closer examination of
the direction of causality between trust and compliance (Siegrist
& Zingg, 2014). As will be developed, we leverage a case in which
government authority instructions on protective measures deviated from the recommendations of international expertise on a key
aspect, and map how citizens adopted the instructions depending on their levels of government trust. This design, with its high
external validity due to the real-world situation, allows us to infer
what is likely a causal impact of government trust on voluntary
compliance with government instructions.
Second, the empirical case we study highlights a previously less
discussed boundary condition for the trust-compliance relationship needed to facilitate crisis management. As explained below,
high levels of citizen trust only help to mitigate a crisis when
government recommendations are accurate and helpful. In other
words, high trust in government might actually be harmful for
citizens’ ability to cope with a dangerous situation if the recommended measures are inadequate.
Our case is the Swedish strategy to handle the COVID-19
pandemic. Just like in other countries, Swedes were implored
to follow a number of protective measures to stop the spread
of the virus, whereof social distancing and handwashing were
the most important. However, the instructions from the Swedish government authorities stand out with regard to the use of
face masks (PHA, 2020; see also https://www.bbc.com/news/

Why Swedes Don’t Wear Face Masks During the Pandemic

337

world-europe-55371102). International crisis management institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO, 2020) and
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC,
2020), had repeatedly promoted face masks as a helpful protective
measure, and this policy was gradually adopted by governments
across the globe. By the early fall of 2020, the Swedish government
was the only government in the developed world that did not recommend, or require, its citizens to wear face masks in any context
(Andersson & Aylott, 2020; Petherick et al., 2020). In fact, in the
spring, statements were made that face masks could be counterproductive in certain circumstances (Expressen, 2020; PHA, 2020). If
the trust-compliance relationship works as suggested in the literature, high trust in Swedish government authorities would lead to
a higher likelihood of citizens complying with certain recommendations such as to wash hands carefully, but simultaneously a lower
likelihood of wearing face masks.
For empirics, we draw on a web survey with a large sample
of adult Swedes (n > 10,000) conducted in the fall of 2020, just
before and at the beginning of the second wave of the COVID-19
pandemic in Sweden. For some key variables, we also have panel
data information that goes back to the first phase of the pandemic
in the spring of 2020.

Literature Review
Trust in Government, Adoption of Protective Measures, and
Crisis Communication
Trust in government and government institutions is often
treated as a crucial element when dealing with crises and disasters (Christensen & Laegreid, 2005; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003;
Siegrist & Zingg, 2014; Van der Weerd et al., 2011). A lack of general government trust may influence risk perceptions and undermine people’s willingness/ability to mitigate risks and support risk
management (Devine et al., 2020; Siegrist & Zingg, 2014; Van der
Weerd, 2011).
Health communication research conducted during previous pandemics, such as the Ebola outbreak in 2014–2016 (Blair
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et al., 2017; Morse et al., 2016), the SARS pandemic, the avian
influenza, and the H1N1 (swine flu) pandemic (Siegrist & Zingg,
2014), confirm that respondents with high government trust are
more inclined to take precautionary actions to protect themselves
and abide recommendations to mitigate the spread of the disease.
However, as Siegrist and Zingg conclude in their overview of the
field, the causal interpretation of these studies is questioned since
they build on weak designs for causal inferences. For example,
they mainly rely on cross-sectional data without persuasive identification strategies.
Also, with regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, research indicates that trust is conducive for compliance with government
recommendations, although there are exceptions (Ling Wong
& Jensen, 2020). Studies from the early phases of the pandemic
observe that high trust in government institutions is associated
with willingness to adopt protective measures such as social distancing, washing hands, testing for infection, and wearing face
masks (Devine et al., 2020). Further, higher trust is related to
higher levels of obeying regulations and recommendations (Han
et al., 2020; Olsen & Hjorth, 2020), lower mortality rates (Oksanen
et al., 2020), and intention to get vaccinated (Parson Leigh et al.,
2020).
To sum up, previous research theorizes that there is a causal
relationship between trust in government and its institutions and
citizens’ compliance with protective measures. However, confidence in this assumption would be strengthened if it rested on
studies using research designs more suited at establishing causality. By analyzing the contrasting government recommendations in
Sweden regarding the use of face masks and handwashing during
the COVID-19 pandemic, we can more precisely address the
causal relationship.
Our design rests on the peculiarities of the Swedish case, where
the crisis communication from the government is consistent with
almost all other countries in the world regarding the importance
of handwashing, but stands out when it comes to the use of face
masks, which also has caused intense public debate and critique.
By analyzing this contrast in recommendations, we are better
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positioned to explore what is presumably a causal effect of compliance on protective measures.
Sweden: Risk Culture, COVID-19 Strategies and Crisis
Communication
Sweden is characterized by a pronounced state-oriented risk culture (Cornia et al., 2016). Government institutions are expected to
effectively administer disaster prevention, mitigate ongoing crises,
and to guide and inform citizens through a crisis. Furthermore,
Swedish governance relies on highly independent government
authorities, and the Swedish government early announced that
it would follow the advice of the Public Health Agency (PHA)
during the COVID-19 pandemic (Pierre, 2020). Accordingly,
Sweden’s strategy for handling the pandemic was designed and
communicated by the PHA through frequent press conferences,
interviews, and information campaigns. When we address the
trust-compliance relationship in Sweden during the COVID-19
pandemic, we thus refer to trust in government authorities, not
the political dimension of government. This distinction is not
emphasized in previous research on trust and crisis management,
mostly because government control over authorities is stronger in
many countries, but also because governments in most countries
may declare a state of emergency and centralize authority during
a crisis. State of emergency can only be declared in Sweden during
wartime (Pierre, 2020).
A prerequisite for the Swedish state-oriented risk culture is
trust, and in international comparison, Sweden has high levels of
both institutional and interpersonal trust (Martinsson & Andersson, 2019; Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2020), levels that increased even
higher due to the rally effect during the first months of the coronavirus crisis (Esaiasson et al., 2020; Johansson & Vigsø, 2021).
The high levels of trust were also the cornerstone in the Swedish
coronavirus strategy; the public was expected to voluntarily follow
the recommendations of the experts (Johansson & Vigsø, 2021).
Compared to other countries, the Swedish response to the
COVID-19 pandemic was less invasive, and without a lockdown
(Andersson & Aylott, 2020; Petherick et al., 2020). Rather than
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coercive measures, the strategy has relied on advice and recommendations, many of which were similar to those in other countries. People were encouraged to wash their hands frequently and
avoid social contacts, especially indoors. Importantly, the PHA
never recommended, leave alone mandated, the use of face masks
in Sweden. The arguments being that masks did not protect against
being infected, that wearing a mask risked inducing false security
and lower people’s caution, and that incorrect handling of the mask
might even lead to increased spreading of the virus (PHA, 2020).
Even as more scientific evidence accumulated on the usefulness of
masks, especially in reducing the spread from infected people to
others (Chu et al., 2020), the PHA maintained that the evidence
was insufficient. In this respect, Sweden’s strategy differed remarkably from countries worldwide (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 Face Covering Policies During the COVID-19 Pandemic,
Oct 26, 2020
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While we do not have specific evidence from the survey, based
on previous research on information seeking and news media consumption, we can assume that Swedes were aware of the specific
recommendations by the PHA. Not only were the agency’s press
conferences followed directly by large audiences, but they were
also reported on widely in the news media. With Swedes being
high news consumers in general, and especially during a crisis
(Andersson, 2020), it is likely that people knew of the recommendations and how they diverged from those in other countries. Not
at least since citizens could compare the non-use of face masks in
Sweden with media reporting of people using face masks in other
countries. In addition, the PHA’s position on the use of face masks
was publicly debated, and the non-use of face masks was the most
frequently recurring question from journalists during the daily
press conferences (Dahlgren, 2021).
Hypotheses
Against this background, we can explicate the logic of our research
design. Since trust generally increases compliance, and since governments want their citizens to protect themselves from the coronavirus, we expect that Swedes with higher trust in government
will willingly comply with the action recommended by the government authorities, such as frequent handwashing. However,
and this is why the Swedish case is informative about the potential causal character of the trust-compliance relationship, when
it comes to wearing face masks, trust in government is expected
to lead to other behavioral consequences in Sweden than in the
rest of the world. Since there is no recommendation from the government authorities to wear face masks in public places, trusting
Swedes will not make the extra inconvenience of wearing them.
More formally, our hypotheses are:
H1: Swedes with higher trust in government are more likely to
wash their hands more frequently than Swedes with lower trust in
government.
H2: Swedes with higher trust in government are less likely to wear face
masks in public than are Swedes with lower trust in government.
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Method
Participants
Our data is from the Citizen Panel, which is maintained by the
Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE) at the SOM-institute,
University of Gothenburg. The panel includes around 75,000 adult
members from all over Sweden. A smaller portion of the panel has
been recruited through probability-based methods, but an overwhelming majority are self-recruited. Most panelists participate
in surveys and experiments twice a year (www.gu.se/som-institute). We invited a portion of the panel to our survey. The survey was fielded between September 15 and October 26, 2020, and
was completed by 10,226 respondents. We also leverage that some
survey questions were asked to the same individuals in a previous
panel-wave in February and March 2020.
As with the panel at large, our sample is made up of opt-in
participants. For example, the sample has a higher educational
attainment than the Swedish population and is therefore not representative in this respect. Therefore, point estimates should be
interpreted with caution. However, what is more important is that
there is variation in the variables, enabling us to examine the relationship between our key factors. Descriptive statistics are available in Appendix A1.
Measures and Analytical Strategy
Our outcome variables are two pandemic-relevant behaviors:
handwashing and face mask wearing. Handwashing was measured by asking, “Last month, were you more careful with hand
hygiene?” To measure the usage of face masks, we asked the
respondents, “Last month, did you wear a face mask?” For both
types of behavior, respondents could choose between “yes” or “no”
as response options. Eighty-eight percent said they were more
careful with handwashing while 12 percent reported that they
were not. Nineteen percent had worn a face mask and 81 percent
had not. In the analysis below, yes is coded as 1 and no as 0.
One way of thinking about the analytical approach is that it
shares similarities with a within-subjects design that has occurred
naturally in the Swedish context. In one treatment, subjects are
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given the recommendation that they should do something to
reduce the spread of COVID-19 and, in another treatment, they
are not recommended to act in a certain way. Obviously, in a within-subjects design, the outcome variable should be the same. In
our case, it is admittedly not—one is about handwashing and the
other about wearing face masks—but to the extent that they are
both behaviors that aim at reducing the spread, they are equivalent.
Still, since we are cognizant that logic of the within-subject
design might not apply in this case, we include variables in the
models that aim at reducing omitted variable bias. Specifically, we
estimate three models for each outcome. First, we report the effect
of government trust while including interpersonal trust as a covariate in the model. Interpersonal trust is included since the two trust
concepts are related (Vallier, 2019), and we want to reduce the risk
of omitted variable bias due to this factor. Second, we add other
covariates as controls. They include several background factors
such as age, sex, education, and so on. Moreover, we control for
left-right ideology, party support, and news consumption (domestic and foreign). Third, we study the effects of government trust
while controlling for pre-crisis levels of government trust. Here,
we rely on the panel components of the data. In addition, we test if
the effects on the two dependent variables are different.
We measured trust in government, our main independent
variable, with the following question: “Generally speaking, how
much trust do you have in Swedish government authorities?” Five
response options were available (“Very low,” “Rather low,” “Neither low nor high,” “Rather high,” and “Very high.”). Unless otherwise noted, this and other variables have been re-coded to range
from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more trust (M = 0.70,
SD = 0.24).
Interpersonal trust was measured with the following question: “In your opinion, to what extent is it generally possible to
trust people?” The endpoints were labelled with “People cannot
generally be trusted” and “People can generally be trusted.” Five
response options were available (M = 0.75, SD = 0.24). We measured exposure to foreign media on the coronavirus by asking
respondents the extent to which they search for information about
the coronavirus in foreign media. Five response options were
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available, ranging from several times a day to never. Exposure to
domestic media on the coronavirus was measured with a similar
question and response option, but it asked about domestic media
instead. Higher values indicate more information search. Leftright ideology was measured by asking respondents to place themselves on an 11-point scale where endpoints (far left and far right)
and the midpoint (neither left nor right) were labelled. Higher values indicate more right-leaning. Party support is dummy coded
where government supporters are the baseline. Opposition party
support and other party/don’t know/ref are dummies in the model.
Sex is dummy coded where female is the baseline and male = 1.
Age of the respondent is measured with six categories. Education
indicates the respondent’s highest educational attainment. The
variable has nine categories, with higher values indicating more
education. Location is dummy coded with “Large city (central)”
as the baseline. Dummy categories are “Large city (suburb),” “City
(central),” “City (outskirts),” “Town,” “Small town,” and “Countryside.” Foreign-born is a dummy variable indicating the country
of birth, where born in Sweden is the baseline. Government trust
lagged is trust in institutions measured the same as above, but in
February or March 2020 (M = 0.64, SD = 0.25). Interpersonal trust
lagged measures social trust, also in February or March with the
same questions and options as above (M = 0.73, SD = 0.23). Table
A1 has additional details on frequency distributions by variables.

Results
We expect that government trust will have contrasting effects on
washing hands and wearing face masks. Because of the binary
outcome variables, we rely on logistic regression for estimates.
Turning first to handwashing, our results show that higher government trust is associated with greater likelihood of more careful
hand hygiene, which yields support for H1. For example, we find
that the average likelihood of careful hand hygiene at the lowest
level of trust is 0.82 while it is 0.91 at the highest level of trust. The
odds ratio is 2.108 (95% CI [1.618, 2.748], p < 0.001) according to
the results in model 1 of Table 1. The results are also illustrated by
Figure 2. There seems to be somewhat of a reduced effect when we
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include more covariates (models 2 and 3), but the effect of government trust is largely the same, and still statistically significant
(p < 0.05) in both models. As expected, people who trust government authorities tend to follow its recommendations.
FIGURE 2

Probability of Careful Hand Hygiene by Government Trust

Next, we turn to H2 and the likelihood of wearing face masks.
Figure 3 shows that higher government trust is associated with a
lower likelihood of wearing face masks. For example, an individual at the lowest end of the trust scale (“Very low”) had a probability of 0.33 whereas someone at the highest end (“Very high”)
had a probability of 0.14. The odds ratio of the estimate is 0.335
(CI: 0.270 – 0.417, p < 0.001). This provides support for H2. In
other words, for this type of behavior, trust in government authorities has the opposite effect compared to the effect on handwashing. These results are robust to the inclusion of additional control
variables, as the results in models 2 and 3 show. The figure is based
on the first model of Table 2, where only interpersonal trust is
included as a control variable. It is especially noteworthy that the
effect is substantially the same even when prior levels of trust are
taken into account (model 3) since this model reduces the risk of
omitted variable bias.

Large city (suburb)

Education

Age

Male

Other party, dk/ref

Opposition party supporter

Left-right ideology

Domestic media on the coronavirus

Foreign media on the coronavirus

Interpersonal trust

0.746***
(0.135)
0.221
(0.137)

(1)
Logit coef

(2)
Odds ratio
2.108
(1.618 - 2.748)
1.247
(0.953 - 1.632)

Determinants of Careful Hand Hygiene

Government trust

TABLE 1

0.368**
(0.153)
0.149
(0.142)
0.266*
(0.140)
1.386***
(0.143)
-0.073
(0.171)
-0.036
(0.010)
-0.107
(0.103)
-0.066
(0.073)
-0.409***
(0.133)
0.075
(0.138)
0.047
(0.099)

(3)
Logit coef
1.445
(1.069 - 1.951)
1.161
(0.880 - 1.532)
1.304
(0.992 - 1.715)
3.998
(3.023 - 5.289)
0.929
(0.665 - 1.299)
0.964
(0.793 - 1.172)
0.898
(0.734 - 1.100)
0.937
(0.811 - 1.082)
0.664
(0.512 - 0.862)
1.078
(0.822 - 1.413)
1.049
(0.863 - 1.273)

(4)
Odds ratio
0.428**
(0.189)
0.333*
(0.179)

(5)
Logit coef
1.534
(1.059 - 2.220)
1.396
(0.982 - 1.983)

(6)
Odds ratio
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10,131

Observations

3.886
(3.169 - 4.766)

(2)
Odds ratio

9,999

1.163***
(0.244)

0.073
(0.112)
-0.037
(0.114)
0.335*
(0.178)
0.044
(0.113)
0.074
(0.118)
0.440
(0.319)

(3)
Logit coef

3.200
(1.985 - 5.161)

1.076
(0.863 - 1.340)
0.964
(0.771 - 1.205)
1.399
(0.987 - 1.981)
1.045
(0.837 - 1.304)
1.077
(0.855 - 1.357)
1.552
(0.831 - 2.900)

(4)
Odds ratio

10,097

0.479***
(0.184)
-0.271
(0.189)
1.392***
(0.111)

(5)
Logit coef

1.614
(1.126 - 2.314)
0.763
(0.526 - 1.105)
4.024
(3.235 - 5.006)

(6)
Odds ratio

Note: The first column of each model are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and the second column are odds ratios with
confidence intervals (95%) in parentheses. For measurement and coding of control variables, see appendix. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

1.357***
(0.104)

Constant

Interpersonal trust lagged

Government trust lagged

Foreign-born

Countryside

Small town

Town

City (outskirts)

City (central)

(1)
Logit coef
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Probability of Wearing Face Mask by Government Trust

We are studying two behavioral outcomes where the government has given contrasting recommendations. Besides finding that
the effects are statistically significant on their own and in opposing
directions, we complement this analysis by simultaneously estimating the models and testing if the coefficients are different. The
χ2-test is statistically significant at p < 0.001, thus rejecting the null
hypothesis that they are similar, which again affirms the contrasting effects noted above.
Other Determinants of Washing Hands
and Wearing Face Masks
Besides government trust, other factors also appear to play a role
in handwashing. Table 1 (model 2) shows that people who pay
more attention to domestic media’s coverage of the coronavirus are more likely to engage in careful handwashing (OR: 3.998,
p < 0.001). Given that domestic media have devoted a substantial
portion of their coverage to the importance of hand hygiene, mirroring the position of relevant institutions, this finding has a plausible explanation. In addition, this exploratory analysis of statistically
significant results indicates that older individuals are less likely to
wash hands than younger individuals are (OR: 0.664, p = 0.002).

Large city (suburb)

Education

Age

Male

Other party, dk/ref

Opposition party supporter

Left-right ideology

Domestic media on the coronavirus

Foreign media on the coronavirus

Interpersonal trust

-1.093***
(0.111)
-0.028
(0.114)

Logit coef
0.335
(0.270 - 0.417)
0.972
(0.778 - 1.216)

Odds ratio

(1)

Determinants of Wearing Face Mask

Government trust

TABLE 2

-0.945***
(0.129)
-0.153
(0.122)
1.746***
(0.108)
0.012
(0.127)
0.282**
(0.144)
0.115
(0.083)
-0.095
(0.090)
-0.229***
(0.060)
0.040
(0.108)
0.474***
(0.128)
-0.078
(0.075)

Logit coef
0.389
(0.302 - 0.501)
0.858
(0.676 - 1.090)
5.730
(4.638 - 7.079)
1.012
(0.789 - 1.296)
1.326
(1.000 - 1.758)
1.121
(0.953 - 1.320)
0.910
(0.763 - 1.085)
0.795
(0.707 - 0.895)
1.041
(0.842 - 1.287)
1.607
(1.251 - 2.065)
0.925
(0.798 - 1.071)

Odds ratio

(2)
-1.116***
(0.157)
-0.148
(0.149)

Logit coef

0.328
(0.241 - 0.445)
0.862
(0.644 - 1.154)

Odds ratio

(3)
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-0.694***
(0.087)
10,141

0.500
(0.421 - 0.592)

Odds ratio

(1)

-1.177***
(0.208)

-0.515***
(0.093)
-0.571***
(0.100)
-0.175
(0.134)
-0.458***
(0.095)
-0.635***
(0.102)
0.202
(0.205)

Logit coef

10,013

0.308
(0.205 - 0.463)

0.598
(0.498 - 0.718)
0.565
(0.465 - 0.687)
0.839
(0.645 - 1.091)
0.633
(0.525 - 0.762)
0.530
(0.434 - 0.648)
1.223
(0.818 - 1.829)

Odds ratio

(2)

-0.008
(0.153)
0.203
(0.156)
-0.734***
(0.093)

Logit coef

10,107

0.992
(0.735 - 1.340)
1.225
(0.902 - 1.664)
0.480
(0.400 - 0.576)

Odds ratio

(3)

Note: The first column of each model are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and the second column are odds ratios with
confidence intervals (95%) in parentheses. For measurement and coding of control variables, see appendix. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Observations

Constant

Interpersonal trust lagged

Government trust lagged

Foreign-born

Countryside

Small town

Town

City (outskirts)

City (central)

Logit coef
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As for other factors associated with wearing face masks, we
find that men seem less likely to wear masks than women (OR =
0.795, p = 0.001) and that individuals who consume a great deal of
foreign media appear more likely to wear masks than those who do
not (OR = 5.730, p < 0.001). Moreover, mask wearing seems more
common among highly educated people (OR = 1.607, p < 0.001)
and among people on the right of the ideological spectrum (OR =
1.326, p = 0.05). In addition, the findings indicate that individuals
living outside the centers of large cities (the baseline category) are
generally less likely to wear masks.
Of these findings, it is perhaps the relationship between foreign media consumption and wearing face masks that is the most
intriguing. It seems as people who get their information from
abroad, where face masks are generally recommended, tend to
adjust their face mask behavior accordingly.

Discussion
To investigate the causal effect of government trust on compliance with government instructions, we leverage a peculiarity in
the Swedish strategy in response to the COVID-19 pandemic: citizens are recommended to wash their hands frequently, but are
not encouraged to wear face masks. From this, we derive two predictions about differential behavior: If government instructions
impact causally upon the precautionary measures individuals are
willing to undertake, citizens with higher trust in government will
be more likely to be careful with hand hygiene than citizens with
lower trust in government, but less likely to wear face masks. Our
findings from a large and diverse sample of Swedish adults generate precisely this pattern. The results hold under control for prior
levels of trust in government, and a host of potential confounding
variables like interpersonal trust, partisanship, news media use,
education, age, and gender.
However, as trust levels are observed and not induced at random, our findings are not conclusive, but with the logic of the
within-subjects design and statistical adjustments, they strengthen
the belief in a causal interpretation of the trust-compliance relationship that frequently appears in the literature on risk and crisis
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management/communication. It does indeed seem that high levels
of government trust is conducive for the citizens’ willingness to
follow government recommendations during crises.
Consequently, the government’s crisis communication will
have extensive possibilities to change citizen behavior during a
crisis, at least in a state-oriented risk culture like Sweden. Further,
the government can then even recommend and effectively implement protective measures, which contradict advice given by international health organizations like the WHO/ECDC, and citizen’s
mediated experiences of the situation in other countries.
In relation to this, we return to the prerequisite for effective
crisis management that we mentioned in the introduction—that
the government provides the best possible advice to its citizens.
When citizens put their trust in the government and follow its
recommendations, they rely on the government’s ability to both
evaluate risks and to put citizen’s interest first (Hamm et al., 2019).
In essence, people use the government as a source cue to simplify
a complex information environment. For this approach to work,
enabling a form of low-information rationality (see Popkin, 1991)
the quality of the recommendations is crucial. If recommended
protective measures turn out to be ineffective, or even detrimental,
high trust becomes counterproductive in citizens’ attempts to cope
with a crisis. High trusting citizens will consequently be less capable compared with low trusting citizens to protect themselves and
others if they follow government recommendations, which underlines the normatively problematic aspects of blind trust.
The possible harm of giving inadequate advice also relates to
the literature on risk and crisis communication ethics. According
to the precautionary principle, measures should be taken to eliminate risks (Leslie, 2006) and significant choice so that citizens,
based on accurate and relevant information, may be able to protect
themselves, or at least make an informed choice about what to do
(Ulmer et al., 2011). Since trust is such a powerful tool in risk and
crisis communication, practitioners should acknowledge the great
responsibility that comes with this mechanism. What if the given
recommendations are inaccurate? And if so, what are the consequences for government trust and future possibilities of effective
crisis communication?

Why Swedes Don’t Wear Face Masks During the Pandemic

353

There are, of course, several limitations of this study. The
question of causality in the trust-compliance relation has already
been discussed, so also consequences of the non-probability sample. Further, while the study has variation in measures of recommended and non-recommended behavior, we lack appropriate
questions about other types of behavior. For example, additional
measures of adopting recommended social distancing would have
strengthened the analysis of the trust-compliance relationship.
Furthermore, the investigation of the trust-compliance relationship in this study is limited to a state-oriented risk culture and one
could assume that the effectiveness of communicating protective
measures is lower in risk cultures with lower institutional trust
(Cornia et al., 2016). Also, one should acknowledge the Swedish
system of governance, having independent government authorities. The combination of independent government authorities and
a tradition of these agencies being responsible for managing the
crises might have strengthened the citizens’ willingness to follow
recommendations. Since government authorities are independent
from the political side of government, the issue of face masks was
never politicized in a way as we have seen in other countries, like
the United States. In order to understand the effectiveness of trust
in crisis communication, we need therefore investigate how the
trust-compliance relationship plays out in countries where crisis
management is more strongly connected to the prime minister/
president and the cabinet. Therefore, even if the Swedish case gives
us some important takeaways on the trust-compliance relationship, and the ethical implications of this relationship, we need to
further investigate the scope and limitation of trust in crisis communication.
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APPENDIX TABLE A1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable/Options

Freq.

Percent

Used face mask last month
No
Yes
Total

8,229
1,919
10,148

81.09
18.91
100.00

Careful with hand hygiene
No
Yes
Total

1,181
8,957
10,138

11.65
88.35
100.00

Government trust
Very low
Rather low
Neither low nor high
Rather high
Very high
Total

293
940
1,416
5,472
2,088
10,209

2.87
9.21
13.87
53.60
20.45
100.00

Interpersonal trust
1 People cannot generally be trusted
2
3
4
5 People can generally be trusted
Total

212
562
1,850
3,971
3,598
10,193

2.08
5.51
18.15
38.96
35.30
100.00

Government trust (Feb/Mar)
Very low
Rather low
Neither low nor high
Rather high
Very high
Total

377
1,356
1,773
5,323
1,374
10,203

3.69
13.29
17.38
52.17
13.47
100.00

Interpersonal trust (Feb/Mar)
1 People cannot generally be trusted
2
3
4
5 People can generally be trusted
Total

137
630
1,839
4,482
3,103
10,191

1.34
6.18
18.05
43.98
30.45
100.00

Coronavirus info search: Foreign media
Never
Rarely
Once a week
Daily
Several times a day
Total

3,209
3,534
2,057
1,104
232
10,136

31.66
34.87
20.29
10.89
2.29
100.00

Coronavirus information search: Swedish media
Never
Rarely
Once a week
Daily
Several times a day
Total

307
1,543
2,910
4,322
1,090
10,172

3.02
15.17
28.61
42.49
10.72
100.00

Variable/Options

Freq.

Percent

Left-right ideology
0 Far left
1
2
3
4
5 Neither left nor right
6
7
8
9
10 Far right
Total

399
519
1,142
1,326
1,158
1,332
1,075
1,409
1,204
368
268
10,200

3.91
5.09
11.20
13.00
11.35
13.06
10.54
13.81
11.80
3.61
2.63
100.00

Party support
Government
Opposition
Other, Don’t know, Refusal
Total

5,282
3,591
1,305
10,178

51.90
35.28
12.82
100.00

Sex
Female
Male
Total

3,230
6,981
10,211

31.63
68.37
100.00

Age
< 30
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
≥ 70
Total

189
650
1,005
2,829
2,585
2,968
10,226

1.85
6.36
9.83
27.66
25.28
29.02
100.00

Highest level of education
Not completed elementary school
Completed elementary school
High school, < 3 years
High school, ≥ 3 years
Post-secondary education, < 3 years
Post-secondary education, ≥ 3 years
College/University, < 3 years
College/University, ≥ 3 years
Doctoral degree
Total

9
287
640
763
727
267
1,064
5,813
655
10,225

0.09
2.81
6.26
7.46
7.11
2.61
10.41
56.85
6.41
100.00

Location
Large city (central)
Large city (suburb)
City (central)
City (outskirts)
Town
Small town
Countryside
Total

1,887
2,434
1,482
1,323
468
1,414
1,216
10,224

18.46
23.81
14.50
12.94
4.58
13.83
11.89
100.00

Country of birth
Sweden
Foreign
Total

10,079
146
10,225

98.57
1.43
100.00

